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SCHOOL AID:
CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES AFTER AGUILAR
v. FELTON
CHARLES H. WILSON, ESQUIRE*
To avoid possible confusion, I will refer to the Felton decision as it
will be reported in the Supreme Court Reports-Aguilar v. Felton.' Other
speakers have referred to that case as it was referred to in the District
Court and Court of Appeals-i.e., Felton. But the case will be reported by
the Supreme Court as Aguilar v. Felton. Consequently, my references to
Aguilar refer to the Felton case mentioned by others.
The cases of Grand Rapids School District v. Ball' and Aguilar v.
Felton were issued on July 1, 1985, a day that will be remembered by
those concerned about church/state litigation as a day that struck a se-
vere blow against the concept of equity in education for all children. Par-
ticularly in Aguilar, the Court ruled that private school children have to
be put to severe logistical disadvantages if they are to receive the benefits
of a federal program designed to aid all economically and educationally
disadvantaged children, disadvantages not incurred by public school
children.
I should add that those decisions were disappointing for reasons
other than the results. Both decisions, written by Justice Brennan, are
unanalytical in the extreme. Every time I pick up those cases to reread
them, as I did this morning, I am reminded of the story of the sports fan
who went to a fight and suddenly found that a hockey game had broken
out. Whenever I pick up the Grand Rapids and Aguilar decisions and
read them, I hope that rationality will break out in Justice Brennan's
analysis. But the words of those decisions are immutable and those deci-
sions will always lack analytical coherence.
* Wilson & Connolly.
473 U.S. 404 (1985).
2 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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A second disappointment, apart from the result in those decisions, is
that they seem to signal an end to a trend, begun in 1980, toward deci-
sions that were less hostile toward programs that attempted to accommo-
date religious and secular concerns. I refer specifically to four decisions
from the Court from 1980 through 1984.
The first was Committee for Public Education v. Regan,' a case in
which the Supreme Court by a 5 to 4 vote upheld New York State's Man-
dated Services Act, an act under which public funds flow directly to
church schools. That program reimburses church schools for the costs of
complying with requirements of state law for recordkeeping, maintaining
attendance records and administering standardized or state-prepared
tests. It is the only case on the books where the Supreme Court has vali-
dated a program where public funds flow directly to church-related ele-
mentary and secondary schools, and that seemed to signal the beginning
of the relaxation of the rather rigid Establishment Clause rulings that the
Court issued beginning in 1971.
The second case-one that Mr. Willkie referred to-is Mueller v. Al-
len,4 The Minnesota Tax Education Program in which Justice Powell
joined and which effectively overruled the decision in Committee for Pub-
lic Education v. Nyquist,5 of which Justice Powell was the author.
The third of the cases was Marsh v. Chambers,6 in which the Court
sustained the Nebraska Legislative Chaplain Program. That case seemed
to be quite encouraging because the Court disregarded this three-part test
that has been a constant problem in the aid cases and decided the Marsh
case based on its perception of the understanding of the drafters of the
Bill of Rights as to what the reach of the Establishment Clause should be.
It upheld that program because the very same Congress that passed and
sent the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, on to the states
for ratification approved the congressional chaplain program that has ex-
isted uninterrupted since that day.
The Court reasoned, without much question, that the Congress wrote
the Establishment Clause and did not perceive a conflict between that
clause and legislative chaplains paid with public funds. The Congress that
approved the chaplaincy program could not have viewed it as inconsistent
with the commands of the Establishment Clause. That return to the orig-
inal understanding seemed to offer encouragement.
Finally, we had the decision in Lynch v. Donnelly,' that approved
the inclusion of a Nativity scene in a Christmas display by the City of
3 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
4 403 U.S. 388 (1983).
6 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
6 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
465 U.S. 688 (1984).
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Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In that case, the Court went further than it had
gone since 1952 in the case of Zorach v. Clausen,8 in identifying as a cen-
tral principle underlying the Establishment Clause the accommodation of
religious and secular concerns.
That was the setting in which the Grand Rapids case and the Agui-
lar case came before the Court. The problem was that, with the exception
of Marsh v. Chambers, which was a 6 to 3 decision, the other three cases I
just mentioned were decided by five to four votes, and in each of those
three cases, Justice Powell was the deciding and swing vote. We all antici-
pated as we went to court in December of 1984 for the argument in those
cases that Justice Powell would be the swing vote. In fact, he was, and he
swung the cases against us.
Let me now talk about the decisions themselves.
In Grand Rapids, two programs were at issue. One was called the
Shared-Time Program. Under that program public school teachers went
into church schools during regular school hours and, in leased classroom
premises, offered instruction in several carefully delineated subjects.
Those subjects were remedial and enrichment mathematics, remedial and
enrichent reading, art, music and physical education. The classrooms
were leased at a fixed amount and they were free of religious symbols.
Each of the classrooms in which shared-time instruction was offered had
a sign outside identifying the classroom as a classroom of the public
schools of Grand Rapids School District.
There was a second program at issue-the Community Education
Program. That was a program of after-hours instruction. It was essen-
tially leisure-time instruction although not exclusively. Some of the
courses described by the opinion included arts and crafts, home econom-
ics, Spanish, gymnastics, yearbook production, Christmas arts, drama,
newspaper, model building, etc. One of the problems with that program
was that to have a community education class, there had to be enough
students to sign up for it or it was not offered. The experience of the
Grand Rapids School District was that if a popular teacher in a particular
school-public or private, because the public schools have these same af-
ter-hours programs-offered such a course, it would generally attract
enough students, twelve at a minimum, to justify this course.
In the private or church schools, the teachers who were popular
within the school were the regular teachers employed by the church
schools. Consequently, without exception, the Community Education Pro-
gram was taught in the church schools by full-time teachers of those
schools who were hired as part-time public school teachers by the Grand
Rapids School District.
& 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
SCHOOL AID
The Supreme Court held both the Shared-Time and Community Ed-
ucation Programs unconstitutional as having an impermissible primary
effect of advancing religion. The shared-time program, in particular, ac-
cording to the majority, failed the primary effect test in three ways.9
First, the Court ruled that, because the public school teachers would
be teaching in an educational environment that was pervasively religious,
there was a substantial risk that the teachers would be induced to include
religion in their teaching. Thus, the program could result in state spon-
sored religious indoctrination. Justice Brennan, in so ruling, acknowl-
edged that, as a matter of fact, there was no evidence that there had been
any inclusion of religion in the secular content of the shared-time classes.
But he said, in effect, that because of the pervasively sectarian nature of
these schools there is no need for evidence that religion has in fact seeped
into shared-time instruction. It is sufficient that there is a possibility it
will happen. As a result, you do not have to prove your case. You just
have to speculate that it might happen.
Secondly, the Court ruled that religion would be advanced through
the shared-time program by the "symbolic union" that the church school
students would perceive between church and state by the support that
the challenged programs gave to the education offered by the church
schools. Here Justice Brennan was speculating about how a second or
third grader would perceive the presence of a public school teacher in a
church school, and he concluded that they would perceive a symbolic
union between church and state. Where he finds the basis for that conclu-
sion is beyond my comprehension.
Finally, the Court ruled that the challenge programs have the effect
of providing a substantial state subsidy to the operations of these church
schools. That conclusion grew out of, in part, the fact that the record
showed that students in these church schools got about ten percent of
their education from the Shared-Time Program and that ten percent
amounted to a substantial subsidy by the state of the operations of the
pervasively sectarian schools. On that basis, in addition to the other two
grounds for decision, the Shared-Time Program flunked the primary ef-
fect test.
There were separate dissents written by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
White, Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. All four criticized the
majority for relying on the possibility that state-sponsored religious in-
doctrination would occur in the face of a record that showed no instance
of religion intruding into the secular instruction offered in the Shared-
Time Programs.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, however, did concur in
9 Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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the majority's ruling that the Community Education Program was uncon-
stitutional. In coming to that conclusion, both Chief Justice Burger and
Justice O'Connor stressed the fact that the Community Education Pro-
gram in the church schools was taught almost exclusively by Church
school teachers under the after-hours supervision of the church school
principals.
The Aguilar decision involved, when it was filed, an Establishment
Clause challenge to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965. By the time the Supreme Court ruled, Congress had re-en-
acted Title I as Chapter 1 of the Education Improvement and Consolida-
tion Act of 1981. The program though was unchanged despite that
legislation.
Chapter 1 is a program whereby the federal government funnels
through state agencies billions of dollars to local school districts. The lo-
cal school districts are obligated to use Chapter 1 funds to hire remedial
reading teachers and provide remedial educational instruction to econom-
ically disadvantaged students. At issue in Aguilar, specifically, was New
York City's program for implementing the private school facet of the
Chapter 1 program. Under that program public school teachers went on
the premises of church schools during the regular school day, and pro-
vided remedial instruction to children who met the statutory require-
ments-economic and educational disadvantage. Those qualifications
meant in New York City that the Chapter 1 program was available in
fewer than twenty-five percent of all private schools in the city.
It was not a general aid program. It was directed towards those chil-
dren who needed the help the most. The teachers were under close super-
vision and there was in the record no evidence of any intrusion of religion
into Title I instruction. There was also no evidence of any undue entan-
glement or intrusiveness between the state and the church schools.
In his decision for the Court, Justice Brennan found that there was
no invalid primary effect as there was in Grand Rapids. In so ruling, Jus-
tice Brennan implicitly acknowledged that New York City had taken the
steps necessary to assure that there would be no intrusion of religion into
the secular instruction offered through Chapter 1.
However, that very program of supervision that prevented religious
content in Chapter 1 doomed the New York City program under the en-
tanglement branch of the Establishment Clause test. Thus, in sharing Ti-
tle I on the "catch-22" inherent in the conflicting commands of the pri-
mary effect test and the entanglement test, the majority ruled that the
pervasively sectarian character of the church schools would mean that the
supervision by public school officials of public school Title I teachers in
church schools would involve excessive government entanglement with
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religion."0
The Court gave no specific examples of any entangling clash between
the religious and public school interests because the record was devoid of
any such evidence. Indeed, when the Court became specific about the ad-
ministrative relationships between public and religious school officials
that it viewed as entangling, it described relationships that were devoid of
any religious references. In describing those tainted relationships, the
Court said:
Administrative personnel of public parochial school systems must work to-
gether in resolving matters relating to schedules, classroom assignments,
problems that arise in the implementation of the program, requests for ad-
ditional services and the dissemination of information regarding the pro-
gram. . . . [t]he program necessitates frequent contacts between the regular
and remedial teachers in which each side reports on individual student
needs, problems encountered and results."
There is not a single reference to religion in that quotation, except
perhaps for the word "parochial." That omission is significant, because, as
Mr. Willkie mentioned, the Supreme Court did not say it is unconstitu-
tional for public school teachers to provide this form of instruction to
church school students.
It simply said such instruction cannot be provided on the premises of
the church schools. But the very contacts the Supreme Court described in
the language I quoted will be required in an off-premises program. In
Wolman v. Walter," the Court ruled that off-premises programs of the
type that are now mandated by Aguilar will be constitutional. Because
such off-premises programs require some administrative interaction, one
wonders what the reach of the entanglement proscription really is.
Nevertheless, because there would be the described interaction be-
tween religious and public school employees, the Court simply presumed
excessive entanglement would result. In the process, the majority rein-
forced the Court's decision ten years earlier in Meek v. Pittenger,'" that
seemed to establish a per se rule against any type of communication be-
tween religious school teachers and public school teachers.
The four Justices who dissented in Grand Rapids also dissented in
Aguilar, stressing that the record provided no support for the entangle-
ment fears expressed by the majority and criticizing once again, as those
dissenters have many times, the "catch-22" tension between the primary
effect and entanglement test.
10 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
"1 Id. at 413.
12 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
1- 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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Justice Powell, for whom we had so much hope as a result of the
decisions I described earlier, wrote a separate concurrence. He concurred
in the judgment of both Grand Rapids and Aguilar but wrote separately
in Aguilar. In that concurrence, he did two things that are disturbing.
First, he suggested that the Aguilar program was invalid under the
political entanglement subpart of the entanglement branch of the three-
part Establishment Clause test. He did so even though the Court in
Mueller and in Lynch v. Donnelly, with Justice Powell's concurrence,
seemed to say that political entanglement was no longer an analytical
concern in these cases. Secondly, Justice Powell would have ruled that
the Aguilar program had the same primary effect defects as the Grand
Rapids case. Thus, he would have gone much further than the majority,
despite agreeing with the Second Circuit that Chapter I was a program
that, and I quote from the Second Circuit and from Justice Powell's deci-
sion, "has done so much good and little, if any, detectable harm."'
Let me briefly speculate on the direction Establishment Clause doc-
trine is taking. It is too soon to determine whether Grand Rapids and
Aguilar represent a move away from that trend in the early '80s that I
mentioned or whether they will simply become constitutional aberrations.
I do think that those two decisions cast a constitutional cloud over any
programs that provide direct support for the instruction that occurs in
church-related elementary and secondary schools.
A very disturbing aspect of the Grand Rapids decision was the emer-
gence of the so-called symbolic union aspect of the primary effect test.
That aspect of the ruling is likely to cause difficulties as local public
school administrators try to find off-premises alternatives to the Chapter
1 program. The arguments are already being raised that, when mobile
vans are placed too close to the church school, there will be a symbolic
union between church and state. Whether the argument can be overcome
will depend on the future course of litigation.
I have mentioned that both of these cases were decided by the nar-
rowest of margins, five to four. In fact, if you take the Title I or Chapter 1
litigation from the beginning, the results could not have been closer.
The constitutionality of Title I was considered by eight lower court
judges before it reached the Supreme Court in the Aguilar case. Four of
those judges upheld the constitutionality of on-premises Title I instruc-
tion. The other four ruled the program was unconstitutional.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the lower court judges
were split 4 to 4 on constitutional issues, and the Supreme Court was
divided 5 to 4. I suggest you will not find a closer decision in the annals of
" 473 U.S. 402, 415 (1985) (quoting Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 739
F.2d 48, 72 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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constitutional history.
Some have speculated that, because of the closeness of those deci-
sions, Aguilar and Grand Rapids will have a very short shelf life. I sug-
gest that speculation may be ill-founded. One of the disturbing aspects of
Aguilar is that Justice Brennan seemed to go out of his way to reaffirm
the decision a decade earlier in Meek v. Pittenger1 5 which struck down a
state program that mimicked Chapter 1. I suggest that no matter how
many appointments President Reagan will make to the Supreme Court
before he leaves office, it will be very difficult for a new court to overturn
ten years of precedent.
One need only recall that, when Chief Justice Burger was appointed
to replace Chief Justice Warren, many conservatives in the country hoped
that Miranda v. Arizona 6 would be quickly overruled. Today, Miranda is
alive and well. It has been eroded somewhat, but Miranda is on the
books. It is alive and well.
New Justices are reluctant to come in and suddenly wipe out years of
precedent. Whether new appointments to the Court will have an impact
on these decisions, is quite speculative.
I think our responsibility, as we look at the programs that are being
challenged in the wake of these decisions, is to find the best way to distin-
guish these unfortunate decisions and move ahead in that way.
'5 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
,6 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
